TORPEDO-l3OdTS IX FLEET ACTIOXS.
By Ticut. 31 . CIPEIAXI, of the Italian Xnvy. Translatcd from t h e " Jlarittirna " for May by T. J. IIADDT, R.K.
T~E fcw ideas which follow refer pi~incipnllj-to thc possibility of ctnplojirig torpcdo-boats in n nnvnl action, nntl tlic rules which sliould gowrn tlicir cmployment in any particular cnsc. I n our opinion, tlic various nttcmpts to usc torpedo-boats for csploriug services havc al-
IWJS
given vcr1 incagrc rcsults, and for tlic reason that for tlicsc sciviccs torpedo-boats :ire stratc,nicnlly nnd tactically nltogctlicr iinsuitcd-in tho first casc bccnuw of tlicir limitcd supply of coals nnrl witcr, :uid in tho second from tlicir limited r;iiigc of vision, : \ i d tho difficulty of maintainiiig constant nud prolonged vigilnuce in sucli small vcsscls, particularlj-in I)nd wcatlicr.
A ship c:ui rcmaiu on tlie look-ont casily for 10 dnjs, nnil will conscqucntly only rcquirc rclicf after crcry such iicriocl. 'l'lic rnngc of yision of a ship of tlic '' Eiiridicc " t j p is a t least tlircc times tlint of a torpcdo.l~oat, axid if wc nccord to cncli Jiip 10 dnys' crnisiiig mid f i w dnys for rcplcnisliing, S-c., lvc scc that slio ivcll pcrforiiis thc scrvicc of sis torpedo-boats without crcr bcing EO rctluccd tliroiigh tlie cshaustion of tIio crcw or waiit of supplics as to Lo totally incnpablc of action at sonic distance.
This liappcns bcc:iusc tlic torpcdo-boat is essentially n tactical and not n strtitcgicnl instrument of war, nnd w c do iiot think ivc my? wrong iii attributing to s i s torpcrlo-boats n tactical vnlnc vcry unicli supcrior to tlint of :I ship of thc '' Euridicc" typc, whilst w e would not Iicsitntc to cstimntc thc stratcgicnl vnliis of n singlo ship of this typc as iii csccss or' that of 12 Sliiclinu torpcclo-boats. After this short digression wc may return to our principal subject, rcnicmlcring that duc csccption must Ic rnndc in tlic casc of czploring any particiilai. Iinrbonr or port ivhcro torpcilo-boats might bo 11:orc ixtionally cmploycd tlinn ships.
This prcmiscd, wc liold that n ~invnl forcc on IcnTing to attack niid dcstroy thc encmy slionld not, csccpt undcr prcssurc cf spccid ncccssity, dccidc to lcavc tlic squadrons of torpcdo-boats Lchind. Kot n fcm qucstioiis, ho\vcvcr, press for solution.
Undcr mlint conditions will tlicse torpedo-boats bc able t o iight.
successfully apifist t h e cncniy ? Wlint should Lu tlicir ?acticiil niin iri tlic dcvclopment. of thc action ? Should t h c j procccd in ndrnucc of tlic flcct or follow in tlic i~a r ?
Tlio favourablc ruomcnt for tlic attack of toiycdo-Lo2 ts will LO.
during tlic first cncouiitcr of tho ciicuij or i n tho confusioii which may follow tlic first collision of tlic flccts. 01' to precede it bjnn ai-tillcry ducl; I n goiicral, n-c may hold that it will I c siitlicicnt for 0x10 of tiic flccts to dccitlc on the ntdlc'e iii ordcr to xiiakc it incyitriblc, tlio other cannot aroid it mitliont taking to flight, ail incritablc manmurrc wlicn tlic action rniist bc rcfiiscd, but one wliicli piits tho retreating forcc a t n disadmntagc for tlic artillor1 duel. I n thc considcration of tlic first casc, in d i i c l i tlic two flccts clccidc to commcnco ~I i c action with tlic artillery n t a distniicc wliich m:iy vniy from P,OOO m., n-liicli. is thc masimiiiii for cffcctiro fire, to 1,000, wliicli is tlic miniinurn foi* cficicnt m:;nmuwing, wc iiray cnquirc wlicthcr torpedo-bonts could bc cn~ployed in this first pliasc of tlic action, 01-mlictlier tlicg must bc reserved for tlic sctaoiid. Wo liold (lccitlediy for tlic second. Siipposc that 0110 of the fleets slrould scnd the torpedo-boats to attack thc ciiciny ; two things ma!-Iinppcii, cithcr thc cuciny will takc to his Iiecls, trcsting to his artillery to r c p l tho attack, or lic 11-ill nicct it by sciiding his on-ii torpcdo-boats :igainst tlic attacking oncs. In thc first case I~c will bc at B disadvantagc as rcgnrds thc artillcry, but, on the otlicr hand, the dcstriictioii of tlic :ittacliixig torpedo-boats will Lc ccrhin. Thc nttack, far from :dlots--iiig tlic torpcdo-boats to dcvclop a11 tlicir tactical adrautagcs, will simply rcsult in sacrificing them in order to obtnin :\ monicntary ndrantngc for thc artillcrx, and wc must not forgct that beforo tho attacking boats can nrrire within lnuncliinq dintancc for their t o i npcdocs thcy will intcrfcrc with tlic fim of tlicir own ships.
X o w if tlic retieating sliips after repclling tlic torpctlo-boats of tho cncmr should dccidc to accept battle, t h y i~i l l probably dccidc for tlic mi?& and will go into action with tlieii. own torpedo-boats intact, and tlicsc will comc into cont:ict with tho cncniy iiiitIcr tlic most favoiirnblc circumstnnccs, that is, 011 complction of the first course, when tlic ships comnicncc to turn in thc oppositc tliicction citlicr to rccommcncc thc attack or to succonr somc of their own ships in distress. For us, tliis is tlic propcr moment for the cmploymcnt of tllc torpedo-boats; that is, whcn tlic ships aro stili ciivclopcd iii tlio smokc of tlicir guns and nrc obliged to lrduce spccd in rirtuc of their mananrre. It ccrtninlj appears to US in tliis cast tlint tlic acIrantag0 of having for somo timc obtaincdnnnrtillci.,-gnin would bc gricrously discountcd, and thc sacrificc of tlic torpedo-boats bittcrly rcgrcttcd. IVliilst IVC hold that tlic rctrcat licfol*~ nil attack bj-torpcdo-boats is tlic bcst maiimurrc, wo nil1 considcr wlint, will Iiaplicu wlicn tlic fleet nttackcd mcets it by 1ncan6 of licr own torpcdo-boats. h i oi*dc*r ttl:;t tlic :Ittack bc futilc, it will bc sufliciciit to arrest it; a t a distance of 500 m. ; i t \rill bo suficicnt thcrcforc that thc boats of thc flcct attnckcd Lo launched agaiitst tlio cncniy wlicu at a distaucc of about, 1,000 in., so that wliilc tho attacking boats will Lo under fir0 diiriiig a passage of 1,400 in. u p to n minimum distancc of GOO m., tlic dcfc11d-iiig boats will Lo only undcr t l c firo of tllc cncmy for 400 m., at rniiiinium distance of 1,GOO ni. : cridcntlj thc conditions arc uiicqunl, and thc attacking boats will find tlicmsclvcs Lcforc a supcrior force. Hcrc wc must note that if it is dccidcd to mcct i l torpcdo-boat attack by torpedo-boats, it would be a mistakc to fir tlie momcnt of collision bcjond i l distanco of 500 m., bccnusc this, fa? from affording additional security to thc fleet, would only scrre to zrrcst thc firc of the ships a t thc tiinc wlicn i t would 110 most cffcctirc, and mnkinE it morc probablc thdt whilst tlic fire of tho Ship6 is maskcd, some fortunate boat might cscapc and coinc safely within launching distance. It thus appcars clcar to our minds that N-hcn two flcets prcccdc tlic dccisivc action by an artillcry dncl, tho tactical cmplojmcnt of thc torpcdoboats is illogical.
Thc cmplojment of thcm bccomes logical nhcn tlic two flccts sliapo conrso rcsolntcly and dircctly against cach othcr ; but sliould tlic torpedo-boat attack prcccdo or follow the cnconntcr of thc two squadrons ? Should t h y attempt to launch tlicir torpcdoes at that instant in wliich thc sliips arc coufnscd and thedZEe just cstablishcd ? From tlic construction of modcrn sliips wc cnnuot supposc that " linc ahead" will lic a possiLlc formation in action, as tlic firo of t.11~ grcatcr part of tlic artillcry would bc maskcd. On tlic contrarj-, each will endeavour to. us0 h i s artillcry RS soon as lie is within range ; conscqucntlj-, without entcring into a discussion on tho bcst formation for battlc, wc may ~1 1 3~ that bcforc tlic tactical collision of tlio fleck, it will bc that wliicli will nllom to cach ship tlic fullcst possiblo libcrty in tlic usc of hcr own artillcry.
Lct 11s considcr first tlic case in i~liich thc two flccts dccidc to attack, prccedcd bj-tlicir torpcdo-boats ; firstly, it will be nccessary to clctcrininc tho distance in front of thc formation at which tlic torpedo-boats sliould bc kcpt; secondly, shonld tho boats stop to cngage cadi otlicr or ndrnnco rcsolutc1f:rgainst thcir largcr prcy, i t is of conrsc sutiicicnt if ono of tho squadrons of torpcdo-boats has rcccivcd ordcrs to oppose tho attack of tho otlicr. I n thc lnttci. casc, supposing the flccts liarc throim thcir torpedo-boats forw:ird about c q d distanccs, it is eridcnt that tlic point of collision of tlic boats will bc the field of battlc of thc ships, and tho flccts will conic into action, passing indiscriminatclr fricnds and focs, ]caving to both tho t:tsk of a\-oiding tlic larger ships, as orcry mnnmurrc in immcdintc contact with tlic cncmywonld bc dangcrous. On tlic otlicr hand, tlic flcct which, on sccing tlio 9n6ZEc with tlic torpcdo-boats, slionld h i d e to put off for thc timc a decisivo cnpgcmcnt, would pcrmit thc othcr flcct to intci*fcrc, and dccidc tlio 7 7 d & in favour of tlicir own sidc; in this casc, tlicrcforc, tlic cfrcct would bc n gcncral 97~&!c, tho rcsult dcpcndillg 011 tlic chances of IVRP and tho supcriority of thc torpcdoboats and siiiglc ships. W e arrivo a t similar conchisions if wo considcr the case in whicli tho torpedo-boats pass each othcr and cngngc tlic larger ships. In tlic former cnsc, wc hare cndcmourcd to show t1i:rt tlic torpedo-boats onco launclicd ngninst thc cncmj cauuot 110s-siblj-be descrtcd by thc ships without dooming tlicm to certain destruction. Now, in action with cqual flccts, if Loth adopt tlio same tactics, it is clcar that it is impossiblc to forcscc the result; but, in caw tlic torpcdo-boats do not prcccdc tho flcets a t cqual distaiiccs, t l c odvantagc will bc most dccidcdlp with tliosc wliich prcccdc tho flect Downloaded by [University of Alberta] at 07:12 11 December 2014
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at thc lcsscr distance, on the universal principlc that division is nccessary for subsistence, but union for strciigth. h'ot only will t11c other boats bc a longer timc undcr fire from thc ships, but tlic sliips of tlic flect Iiaririg tlic boats ncarest them will arrivc sooner at the ficld of action, and tlie torpcdo cruiscrs might casilj-girc a p O ( 1 account of tho cncmfs torpcdo-boats alrcady cnygcd with their o\yn, and tho Iattci., having thcir libcrty of action rcstorcd by tho arliral of 11 povicrful force, would still bo able to follow tlic flect and contribute to final rictorj-. Lcaving the qucstion wlietlicr thc torpedo.
boats sliould not bc kept in rcscrrc for tho sccond line of nctiori, it would appear that in putting thcni to tho front it is best to keep tlicrn as close as possiblc to thc main force, so that tlic latter may dccidc this prcliminary strygglc in its ox-n favour before coming to thc final tusslc with the main force of tho cnciny. I n passing 011 to considcr thc othcr casc in which onc of tlic fleets goes into zction prccedcd by its torpcdo-boats, wliilst the other holds them i n rcscrre, many considerations will occur to US. In tlie first placc, wc must cxiquirc whctliui. tlic fire of a squadron dircctcd in part ody, but in fnIl daylight, against n certain niinilcr of torpcdo-boats stcanling against tho ships at full specd would bo capable of arresting tliu boats, considering that tho lattcr would bc undcr fire within n rango of 2,003 m. for tho short period of ono minuto only.
It is well, in thc sccond place, to confront the ercntnalitj-of a fortunstc discliargo undci. tlic conditions most fnvourablc to tlic ships, wlicn tlicir fire hns orilly partidly s~ccccdcd in stopping thc enemy's boats, and of n lost 0x10 d i c n thc clianccs arc in fayour of the boats. Consider what an enormous tactical effcct tho torpcdo-boats kept in rcscrw a t the flanks of R naval forcc would liavc when cmplojcd at tho instant tho drips hare passed each otlicr, and what ralnablc assistancc they could afford in protccting the rc-formation, or, in thc worst case, of corcring tho rctrcat; kcpt intact until close to thc encmy, their resolutc attack would equal in results that of tho wliolc of thc flect, nud tlic larger ships could easily undcrtako tho risk of running tho gauntlct of the enemy's torpedo-boats at full speed, sccing that thcy had already bccn badly uscd bF thc gun-fire, wliilc their own boats would act against tho encrny's sliipy undcr such farourablc conditions that cwxy dischargo should bc a hit. A ship passing n torpcdo-boat in tho oppositc direction at w combined spccd of 34 h o t s , \rould offer n usofal target for a r e v fcw scconds only, and n rcry slight doriation of tho torpedo, combincil with tho cffeci of tho wavc raised by the Iargc ship, would sufficc to rcnder thc dischargo innocnous; it is sufficicnt if cacli of tho torpcdo-bonts has rcccircd somc injury, although not vital, to give L h o p that t h y would not be ablc to avail thcmsclvcs of tbc brief interval which offers for n fiucccssfnl discharge. On thc other hand, may not thc torpcdo-boats iii adrancc g i n R certain guarantcc that tlic cncmy'g boats \ d l bc stoppcd? Is not tho impossibility of defending yourself by tlic artillery at tho most critical moment, when friends and foes will bo groiipcd together, in itself a scrious disadvantagc? And is it not certain that in many circumstances it is bcttcr olily to hare tho Downloaded by [University of Alberta] at 07:12 11 December 2014 TGG TORPEDO-BOATS IS FLEET ACTIOSS. cncniy in front, tlinn to liarc your poscrs of offciicc rcndcrcd fccblc and hesitating from fcar of hitting and destroying friciids ?
But, in fact of all thcsc advantages, who can cstiniatc tlie disastroilj cffcct which tlic fact of a ship torpedoed bcforc arrivinfi in irnmcciiatc contact with tlic ciicniy ~voiilcl liarc on tlic sidc to wliich she. belonged ? Wc cannot do so, but will only rcniark that whilst ncithcr this fact, nor tho monicnt of contact of tlic two flccts, may dccidc tllc fatcof tlic bdtlc, tLc torpedo-boats Iicld in rc'scrve miglit wcll l o able to do so, and onlg under tho prcssurc of tlic scvcrcst rieccssity should wc bc dispcsccl to dispcnsc with tlicin.
It is possible that a squadron possessing torpcdo-boats may hxrc t o cngagc anothcr flcct witlioiit thcm. In this caw, in wliicli w e liave to discuss tlic qucstion of torpedo-boats against sliips, it is niol-c tlian c n x cvideut that tlic torpcclo-boat attack should follow mid not prcccdc tlic attack of tlio ships. A distinctirc clinractcristic of tlro torpedo-boat is its great poirers of offcncc a t sliorl distaiiccs, coiiibincd with r c r~ fccblc poivcrs of dcfcncc, crcrj-ninnacuvrc undcr file is fatal to tlicm, ci-cry attack if not I y surprisc unfruitful, so that tactically tlicly may Lo coinparcd to cavalry on sliorc. Tlic eikct of a c:ivalry cliargc on troops in disordcr o r taken by surprisc may be dccisivc, but it would bc folly to cliargc infantry or artillcry in gcod order solely to obtain a xiiomrntary coiifiisioii at an enormous aacrificp.
Torpcdo-boats thrown forrrard by a n a r d forcc arc gratuitonsljcsposcd to thc c~iciny's firc, and plnccd in n position difficult for a t;ucccssfnl iisc of tlicir torpcdocs. Iri fact, if .tlic torpcdo-boats arc only a short distnncc i n advnxicc of thc ships t h y can iicitlicr sI:tckcn cpecct i i o~ n i a i i~~~i v r c in nny way without bciiig orert:ikcii by tho fleet, arid if they arc a great dist:incc to tlic front thcy arc subjcctcd t o tlic destructive firc of tlrc cncmy's ships. Wlrcn, Ii~wcver, t I q ciitcr into action in tlic ~ccorrd linc t h y Iiave .Z mucli liiglier tactiml caluc, as thcy :ire not damngcd by thc tirc of the enemy, and arc in n marc fayouixllo condition fbr using tlicir torpcdocs, as thc spccd of Somc of tlic ships at lcast will bc rcduccd, and this will bc doui~ly nseful for tho torpcdo-l)oats, ns they will be a b l~ to prcvcnt tlic drips from rc-forming promptly to mcct thcir foes. Naiiaiirring ships will on'cr easy targets to torpedo-boats, and if t h y girc up tho attcrnpt to re-form thcy inaj-IIC attacked a t tlicir~vcakcst points by tIic cnciiiy ~~1 i o . s~ ships arc in good ordcr; and if t l i c~ ~liould take to tlicir Iiccls nt fnll spccd tlicj-will probably lcnvc somo victims behind, and nckno~~lcdgc that tlic bnttlc i s lost.
IVhcn, on tlic otlicr hand, tlic torpedo-boats prcccdc tlic ships, not only is tlicrc no guamntcc that thcy will not all bc dcstropl, b u t tlicir tactical opportunity, which in tlic prcccdiiig casc may kist for some ZCIIS of miriutcs, is limited in this to tlic space of a fcw GCCOIldS, anil once lnunclicd against the cncmy all control over tlicm is lost. Aftcr tllc first cncouritcr thcy will no loiigci* bc cfiicicnt protcctioii for tlic re-forniation ; tlic fatal error of cmplojitig tlicxn prematurely will rcsult in leaving them to wander aimlessly and clisconncctcdiy ior tlio wiriiiindcr of thc day. especially important to prcvcnt tlic encmy from promptly returning on tlic offcnsivc, a t tlic same timc rctaining tho liberty to csecutc tlic same manwurrc yonrself, and tlic most rcasonable way to effect this appears to bc to attack with tlie torpcclo-boats dircctly tbc ships are clear of cnch otlicr.
Tliesc arc briefly our ideas on tlic cmplojmcnt of torpedo-boats iu action; we r n q add tlint tlicy may bc legitimately cmplorcd to .secure the rctrcat of D nnral force, cvcn when in this case it is neccsmry to sacrifice tliem, thcir sacrifice will be a reasonable onc HS in einiilar circurristanccs is that of cavalry on sliorc. In giving chase, considcring tho dangers to wliicli they would bc c x p o~e d~ tlicir liclp should bc dispensed with. Tlic employment of torpedo-boats in action will bc nbovc all conceded to tho flcct tvhicli Iins only for a. short timo left its bnsc of operations and is not at a great distance from it, and is thcrcforc cspcciallly probablc wlicn thc object of the campaign is defcnsivc. The discussion might bo extended if w e wislicd to dcterminc what types of ships should be oppscd to torpedo-boats, but wc limit oursclvcs a t present to establishing tho fact that the function of torpedo-boats is not exploration nor that of infantry scouts, to scck thc first contact and tlic first brush with tho enemy, but on the contrnry to strike liomc, and, like cavalry, to bo kept as far ns possiblc intmt until tho snprcrno moment of onslaught, whcn launchcd on tlic cucmy by surprisc whcn I10 is already mauled by the guns, thcir attack may bc crowncd by a dccisivc victory.
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